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a b s t r a c t
Westudy vonNeumannMorgenstern stable sets for one-to-onematching problemsunder the assumption
of coalitional sovereignty (C), meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to
arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional
deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by path dominance (P) along the lines of
van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009). This results in the pairwise CP vNM set in the case of
pairwise deviations and the CP vNMset in the case of coalitional deviations.We obtain a unique prediction
for both types of stable sets: the set of matchings that belong to the core.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the one-to-onematchingmodel known as themarriage prob-
lem, there are two disjoint sets of agents, saymen andwomen. The
problem is tomatch agents fromone side of themarketwith agents
from the other side, whereas each agent also has the possibility
of remaining single. We refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a
comprehensive overview on two-sided matching problems.
For marriage problems, stability is considered to be a central
property. A matching is stable if each agent on one side is matched
with an acceptable agent on the other side and no two agents of
different sides would prefer to be matched to each other rather
than to stick to their current situation. For marriage markets, this
stability notion is known to be equivalent to core stability.
A matching is in the core if there is no subset of agents who,
by forming only partnerships among themselves, can all obtain
a strictly preferred outcome. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that
the core of a marriage problem is non-empty. Although elements
of the core have the property that they are stable once reached,
it depends on the underlying environment whether it is possible
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: P.Herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl (P. Jean-Jacques Herings),
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0304-4068/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.to reach some core element from any initial situation. Stable sets
as defined in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) address this
concern.
A stable set is a set of outcomes that satisfies internal and
external stability. As argued by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944, p. 41), a stable set describes the ‘‘established order of
society’’ or ‘‘accepted standard of behavior’’. Internal stability
‘‘expresses the fact that the standard of behavior is free from inner
contradictions’’. External stability ‘‘can be used to discredit any
non-conforming procedure’’.
vNM stable sets are crucially dependent on the concept of dom-
inance. Under the standard definition, a matching is dominated by
another matching if there is a coalition such that all its members
prefer the latter matching to the former and no coalition member
has a partner outside the coalition. A set of matchings is a vNM
stable set if it satisfies the conditions of internal and external sta-
bility with respect to this dominance relation. Internal stability re-
quires that no matching inside the set is dominated by a matching
belonging to the set. External stability imposes that any matching
outside the set is dominated by some matching belonging to the
set. Ehlers (2007) shows that for one-to-one matching problems,
the set of matchings in the core is a subset of any vNM stable set
and a vNM stable set can containmatchings outside the core.Wako
(2010) shows that the vNM stable set exists and is unique.
The standard dominance relation used to define vNM stable
sets violates the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, the prop-
erty that an objecting coalition cannot enforce the organization of
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coalitional sovereignty is a very natural property to require when
defining enforceability. For one-to-one matching problems, if a
coalition deviates, then it is free to form any match between its
members; it cannot affect existing matches between agents out-
side the coalition, and previous matches between coalition and
non-coalition members are destroyed. The requirement that the
coalition cannot affect existing matches between agents outside
the coalition is violated in the standard definition of a vNM stable
set.
Coalitional sovereignty is a natural requirement and has been
imposed in other streams in the literature. In the literature on
coalition formation, Hart and Kurz (1983) propose the γ and the δ
model of coalition formation. Let some coalition structure be given
and suppose some coalition deviates. Unaffected players are those
players who are not part of the deviating coalition and were not
together with any player of the deviating coalition in the original
coalition structure. Coalitional sovereignty requires that nothing
changes for the unaffected players and both the γ and the δmodel
respect coalitional sovereignty. Another issue is what happens to
residual players, that is those players who were together with
some player of the deviating coalition in the original coalition
structure. The γ model assumes that the residual players become
singletons after the deviation and the δ model assumes that they
stay together. Kóczy and Lauwers (2004) study the accessibility
of the core of a TU-game in coalitional form and also emphasize
the importance of coalitional sovereignty. They call this property
outsider independence.
For many-to-many matching problems, several authors have
proposed and studied solution concepts that respect coalitional
sovereignty, see in particular Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and
Konishi and Ünver (2006). The important issue in many-to-many
matching problems is not so much coalitional sovereignty, which
is naturally assumed, but rather what happens to links between
members of the deviating coalition and players outside that
coalition, a problem closely related to the treatment of residual
players in models of coalition formation.
An important stream in the literature on matching markets
studies whether a decentralized process of successive blocking
leads to a stable matching, see e.g. Roth and Vande Vate (1990),
Klaus and Klijn (2007), and Kojima and Ünver (2008) for two-
sided matching problems, and Chung (2000) and Diamantoudi
et al. (2004) for roommate problems. All these papers formulate
dominance relations that satisfy coalitional sovereignty.
Finally, several papers on the vNM stable set in the case
of farsighted agents have used notions of enforceability that
respect coalitional sovereignty, see Diamantoudi and Xue (2003)
for hedonic games, Mauleon et al. (2011) for one-to-one matching
problems, Klaus et al. (2011) for roommate markets, and Ray and
Vohra (2015) for non-transferable utility games.
A further criticism of the standard definition of the vNM stable
set is that it does not take into account that a deviation by a
coalition can be followed by further deviations. This corresponds to
the well-known critique by Harsanyi (1974) to the vNM stable set.
Ray and Vohra (2015) emphasize that the notion of enforceability
is especially delicate in the context of farsightedness as formulated
by Harsanyi (1974). We argue here that, even in the standard
myopic case, the same issue comes up when we apply the vNM
stable set to one-to-one matching problems. We will follow the
approach by van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009),
which takes into account that if a matching is blocked by some
coalition and the resulting matching is not in the stable set itself,
then further deviations will take place. This observation leads
van Deemen (1991) to define the generalized stable set for abstract
systems and Page and Wooders (2009) to define the stable set
with respect to path dominance. We show by means of a simpleexample that not allowing for path dominance in the definition
of the vNM stable set for one-to-one matching problems leads
to highly undesirable conclusions when coalitional sovereignty is
required.
Requiring coalitional sovereignty (C) and using the path
dominance relation (P) to define internal and external stability,
now referred to as CP internal stability and CP external stability,
leads to the concept of the CP vNM set. Since in matching theory
it is often assumed that only pairwise deviations are feasible, we
also define the concept of the pairwise CP vNM set in an analogous
way.
We show that there is a unique CP vNM set and a unique
pairwise CP vNM set and that both sets coincide with the core.
Although, as shown by Ehlers (2007), the core may not be a vNM
stable set under the standard definition of the direct dominance
relation,1 it turns out to be the unique prediction when coalitional
sovereignty and path dominance are taken into account.
Since the CP vNM set and the pairwise CP vNM set are
based on paths of deviations resulting from the direct dominance
relation, they should be thought of as myopic concepts. An
alternative would be a farsighted approach based on the indirect
dominance relation as introduced in Harsanyi (1974) and further
developed in Chwe (1994). The vNM farsighted stable sets have
been characterized in Mauleon et al. (2011) as the singleton core
elements. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) show that, in hedonic
games with strict preferences, core partitions are farsightedly
stable for a conservative notion of the concept.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-
onematching problems and standard notions of stability. Section 3
defines and characterizes both the CP vNM and the pairwise CP
vNM set. Section 4 concludes and discusses directions for future
research.
2. One-to-one matching problems
A one-to-one matching problem consists of a finite set of
individuals N , partitioned into a set of menM and a set of women
W . The set of non-empty subsets of N is denoted by N . Each
individual i ∈ N has a complete and transitive preference ordering
≻i over the agents on the other side of the market and the
prospect of being alone. Preferences are assumed to be strict. Let
≻= ((≻m)m∈M , (≻w)w∈W ) be a preference profile. A one-to-one
matching problem is a triple (M,W ,≻).
A matching is a function µ : N → N satisfying the following
properties:
(i) For everym ∈ M, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}.
(ii) For everyw ∈ W , µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w}.
(iii) For every i ∈ N, µ(µ(i)) = i.
The set of all matchings is denoted by M. Given a matching
µ ∈ M, individual i ∈ N is said to be unmatched or single if
µ(i) = i. A matching µ is individually rational if each agent is
acceptable to his or her mate, so for every i ∈ N it holds that
µ(i)≻i i or µ(i) = i. A matching µ that is not individually rational
can be blocked by any individual with an unacceptable partner. For
a given matching µ, a pair {m, w} is said to form a blocking pair if
m andw are not matched to one another but prefer one another to
their mates at µ, i.e. w≻m µ(m) and m≻w µ(w). A matching µ is
stable if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair of agents.
For every i ∈ N , we extend the preference ordering≻i over the
agent’s potential partners to the set of matchings in the following
1 There are not somany classes of gameswhere the core is the unique vNM stable
set of the game.One example of such a class is the class of convex games, see Shapley
(1971).
16 P. Jean-Jacques Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 71 (2017) 14–19way. We say that agent i prefers the matching µ′ to the matching
µ if µ′(i)≻i µ(i) and we write µ′≻i µ. A coalition S ∈ N is said
to block a matching µ ∈ M if there exists a matching µ′ ∈ M
such that µ′(S) = S and µ′≻S µ, where µ′≻S µ is defined as
µ′(i)≻i µ(i) for every i ∈ S. Such amatchingµ′ is said to dominate
the matching µ via S. The set of all such matchings is denoted by
fS(µ), so
fS(µ) = {µ′ ∈M | µ′(S) = S and µ′≻S µ}.
We say that the matching µ′ dominates the matching µ if there is
a coalition S ∈ N such thatµ′ dominates thematchingµ via S and
we denote the set of all such matchings by f (µ), so
f (µ) =

S∈N
fS(µ).
The core C of the matching problem (M,W ,≻) consists of all
matchings that are not blocked by any coalition, so
C = {µ ∈M | f (µ) = ∅}.
It has been shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) that the core of a
matching problem is non-empty. Also, a matching is stable if and
only if it is not blocked by a coalition of size one or two and if
and only if it belongs to the core, see Theorem 3.3 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990).
We next present the standard definition of the von Neumann
Morgenstern (vNM) stable set as introduced in von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) when applied to matching problems.
Definition 1. A set of matchings V ⊂ M is a vNM stable set if it
satisfies the following:
(i) Internal stability: For every µ,µ′ ∈ V , it holds that µ′ ∉ f (µ).
(ii) External stability: For every µ ∈M \ V , it holds that f (µ) ∩ V
≠ ∅.
A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if it satisfies internal
and external stability. Internal stability requires that no matching
inside the vNM stable set is dominated by a matching belonging
to the vNM stable set. External stability states that any matching
outside the vNM stable set is dominated by some matching that
belongs to the vNM stable set.
As for the definition of the core, there is no loss of generality
to restrict attention to coalitions of size one and two when
formulating internal and external stability or to restrict attention
to pairwise deviations. It is immediate that the core is contained
in any vNM stable set. However, since the core may not satisfy
external stability, it may not be a vNM stable set itself.
Given two matchings µ,µ′ ∈ M, let µ ∨ µ′ : N → N be the
function defined by
(µ ∨ µ′)(m) = max≻m {µ(m), µ
′(m)}, m ∈ M,
(µ ∨ µ′)(w) = min≻w {µ(w), µ
′(w)}, w ∈ W .
Similarly, we define µ ∧ µ′ : N → N as
(µ ∧ µ′)(m) = min≻m {µ(m), µ
′(m)}, m ∈ M,
(µ ∧ µ′)(w) = max≻w {µ(w), µ
′(w)}, w ∈ W .
In general, the functionsµ∨µ′ andµ∧µ′ need not be matchings.
A set X ⊂ M of matchings is a lattice if for every µ,µ′ ∈ X it
holds that µ ∨ µ′ ∈ X and µ ∧ µ′ ∈ X . The set X is a distributive
lattice if X is a lattice and for every µ,µ′, µ′′ ∈ X it holds that
µ ∨ (µ′ ∧ µ′′) = (µ ∨ µ′) ∧ (µ ∨ µ′′),
µ ∧ (µ′ ∨ µ′′) = (µ ∧ µ′) ∨ (µ ∧ µ′′).
Knuth (1976) shows that the core C of a matching problem is
a distributive lattice. Ehlers (2007) shows that V is a vNM stableset only if V is a maximal set satisfying C ⊂ V , V is a distributive
lattice, and the set of single agents is the same for every element of
V . Moreover, V is a vNM stable set if V is the unique maximal set
satisfying C ⊂ V , V is a distributive lattice, and the set of single
agents is the same for every element of V . A vNM stable set V
contains the core but can also contain matchings outside the core.
Wako (2010) shows the existence and the uniqueness of the vNM
stable set.
3. vNM sets respecting coalitional sovereignty
The standard dominance relation used in the definition of the
vNM stable sets in one-to-one matching problems denies the
coalitional sovereignty of players outside the objecting coalition
and this could have undesirable consequences. Since in the
formulation of the vNM stable set using the dominance relation f , a
coalition S ∈ N can impose any matching as long as its restriction
to S is feasible for S, the objecting coalition is given implicitly the
power to arrange the matchings of players outside the coalition,
which is clearly undesirable. Ray and Vohra (2015) express the
same criticism towards the vNM stable set for non-transferable
utility games.
In the following, we adapt the dominance relation in such a
way that coalitional sovereignty of players outside the objecting
coalition is respected. Contrary to the dominance relation f , it
may now matter whether the size of the objecting coalition is
unrestricted or takes place by individuals and blocking pairs. We
therefore formulate two dominance relations.
Assume, first, that we do not restrict the size of the objecting
coalition. In order to respect coalitional sovereignty, the blocking of
amatchingµ ∈M by a coalition S ∈ N should result in amatching
µ′ such that the players i ∈ µ(S) \ S become single, whereas the
players in N \ (S ∪ µ(S)) are not affected by this blocking. We
therefore restrict attention to matchings µ′ with this feature and
define the set of matchings that dominate µ via S as follows:
gS(µ) = {µ′ ∈M | µ′(S) = S,
for every i ∈ µ(S) \ S, µ′(i) = i,
for every i ∈ N \ (S ∪ µ(S)),
µ′(i) = µ(i), µ′≻S µ}.
It clearly holds that gS(µ) ⊂ fS(µ). The set of matchings that
dominate µ is now defined as follows:
g(µ) =

S∈N
gS(µ).
It clearly holds that g(µ) ⊂ f (µ). We refer to an element of g(µ)
as an improvement.
In matching theory, it is typical to restrict blocking to
individuals and blocking pairs. Let some matching µ ∈ M be
given. An individual i ∈ N can destroy his match with player µ(i)
whenever µ(i) ≠ i. The players in N \ {i, µ(i)} are not affected
by the destruction of this match, so remain matched to the same
partner. The resulting matching is denoted by µ′ = µ− (i, µ(i)).
A blocking pair (m, w) can destroy their existing matches,
if any, and form a match between them. The players in N \
{m, w,µ(m), µ(w)} are not affected by the formation of such a
match, so keep their existing partners. The resulting matching is
denoted by µ′ = µ+ (m, w).
Let some matching µ ∈ M and some coalition S ∈ N with
S = {i} for some i ∈ N or S = {m, w} with m ∈ M and w ∈ W
be given. We define the set of matchings that dominate µ via S as
follows:
hS(µ) =
{µ′ ∈M | µ′ = µ− (i, µ(i)) and i≻i µ(i)}, S = {i},
{µ′ ∈M | µ′ = µ+ (m, w),
w≻m µ(m), andm≻w µ(w)}, S = {m, w}.
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and for coalitions S consisting of a man and a woman we have
hS(µ) ⊂ gS(µ). In the latter case, inequality may result because
under hS it is not allowed that m and w destroy their current
matchwithout forming a new one together. Notice that in all cases,
hS(µ) is either the empty set or a singleton. We define the set of
matchings that dominate µ as follows:
h(µ) =

i∈N
h{i}(µ)

∪
 
(m,w)∈M×W
h{m,w}(µ)

.
It clearly holds that h(µ) ⊂ g(µ). We refer to an element of h(µ)
as a pairwise improvement.
Although it might be tempting to define the vNM stable set by
replacing f (µ) by either g(µ) or h(µ) in Definition 1, the following
example shows this to be problematic.
Example 1. Consider a matching problem (M,W ,≻), whereM =
{m1,m2},W = {w1, w2}, and the preferences of the individuals
are as follows.
m1 m2
w1 w1
w2 w2
m1 m2
w1 w2
m1 m2
m2 m1
w1 w2.
We represent a matching µ by the set of (m, w) pairs that
are matched in µ. There is a single stable matching µ∗ =
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}. The core has µ∗ as its unique element. For
every µ ∈ M such that µ ≠ µ∗ we have that µ∗ ∈ f (µ). It now
follows easily that there is a unique vNM stable set Vf and that this
set is equal to the core, Vf = C = {µ∗}.
However, according to the dominance relation g , the matching
µ∗ does not dominate the matching µ′ = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}.
Indeed, only the grand coalition N can enforce the matching µ∗
from µ′ under g . Since µ′≻m2 µ∗,m2 would block the deviation
by the grand coalition from µ′ to µ∗.
Let Vg be a vNM stable set based on the dominance relation
g . Since g(µ∗) = ∅, external stability requires µ∗ ∈ Vg . For
every matching µ not equal to µ∗, µ′, or {(m2, w1)}, it holds
that µ∗ ∈ g(µ), so in order not to violate internal stability,
µ ∉ Vg . Since g(µ′) only contains the matching {(m1, w1)} and
{(m1, w1)} ∉ Vg , it holds that µ′ ∈ Vg by external stability. Since
µ′ ∈ g({(m2, w1)}), it follows that Vg = {µ∗, µ′}.
The fact that µ′ belongs to Vg is problematic. The only
improvement from µ′ is given by the matching {(m1, w1)}. Since
{(m1, w1)} does not belong to Vg , one needs µ′ to be part of
Vg in order to satisfy external stability. However, starting from
the matching {(m1, w1)}, there is only one further improvement,
i.e. toµ∗, and fromµ∗ there are no further improvements. Given a
matchingµ′, one would therefore expect to end up inµ∗, which is
part of Vg , and µ′ should not be regarded as stable.
When using the dominance relation h in Definition 1, the sets
{µ∗} and {µ∗, µ′} would not qualify as stable sets. Denoting the
matching where every individual is unmatched by µ∅, we have
that µ∗ ∉ h(µ∅) and µ′ ∉ h(µ∅), so external stability would be
violated.
Let Vh be a vNM stable set based on the dominance relation
h. Since h(µ∗) = ∅, external stability requires µ∗ ∈ Vh. Since
µ∗ ∈ h({(m1, w1)}) and µ∗ ∈ h({(m2, w2)}), it follows from
internal stability that {(m1, w1)} ∉ Vh and {(m2, w2)} ∉ Vh.
Since h(µ′) contains only the matching {(m1, w1)} and
{(m1, w1)} ∉ Vh, it follows from external stability that µ′ ∈ Vh.
The set h(µ∅) consists of the two matchings {(m1, w1)} and
{(m2, w2)}. Since {(m1, w1)} ∉ Vh and {(m2, w2)} ∉ Vh, external
stability then requires that µ∅ ∈ Vh.Finally, since µ′ ∈ h({(m1, w2)}) and µ′ ∈ h({(m2, w1)}),
it follows from internal stability that {(m1, w2)} ∉ Vh and
{(m2, w1)} ∉ Vh.
We reach the conclusion that Vh = {µ∗, µ′, µ∅} is the unique
vNM stable set based on the dominance relation h. Since µ∅ is
the worst matching for all individuals, this is a highly undesirable
conclusion. 
Example 1 shows that the assumption of coalitional sovereignty
affects the vNM stable set. Also, under coalitional sovereignty, it
matterswhether blocking coalitions canbe of any size or if blocking
is restricted to pairwise deviations and deviations by individuals.
The reason for this difference is that external stability requires
each matching not in the stable set to be directly dominated by an
element in the stable set. If a matching µ is dominated by another
matchingµ′ via a coalition S of cardinality greater than two, then it
may not be the case thatµ′ can be enforced fromµ by an individual
or a pair.
Rather than requiring direct domination, it should be sufficient
for external stability that there is a sequence of matchings,
each matching in the sequence dominating the previous one,
that ultimately reaches a matching in the stable set. Indeed, if
a matching that is not in the stable set is blocked by some
coalition and the resultingmatching is not stable itself, then further
improvements will take place. We make a similar requirement for
testing internal stability. That is, if amatching belongs to the stable
set, then there should be no sequence of matchings, eachmatching
in the sequence being dominated by the next one, that ultimately
reaches another matching in the stable set. These requirements
correspond to path dominance as defined in van Deemen (1991)
and Page and Wooders (2009).
Let some µ ∈M be given. The set
h2(µ) = h(h(µ)) = {µ′′ ∈M | ∃µ′ ∈ h(µ) such that µ′′ ∈ h(µ′)}
consists of those matchings that can be reached by a composition
of two pairwise improvements starting at µ. We extend this
definition and, for k ∈ N, we define hk(µ) as those matchings
that can be reached from µ by a composition of k pairwise
improvements. The transitive closure of h is denoted by h∞ and
is defined as
h∞(µ) =

k∈N
hk(µ), µ ∈M.
Since the setM is finite, it holds that, for some k′ ∈ N, for every
µ ∈M, h∞(µ) =k∈{1,...,k′} hk(µ).
When taking into account the requirements of coalitional
sovereignty (C) and path dominance (P), while only allowing for
pairwise deviations, we obtain the notion of a pairwise CP vNM
set, more formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. A set of matchings V ⊂ M is a pairwise CP vNM set
if it satisfies the following:
(i) Pairwise CP internal stability: For everyµ,µ′ ∈ V , it holds that
µ′ ∉ h∞(µ).
(ii) Pairwise CP external stability: For every µ ∈ M \ V , it holds
that h∞(µ) ∩ V ≠ ∅.
Condition (i) of Definition 2 corresponds to pairwise CP internal
stability. For any two matchings µ and µ′ in the pairwise CP vNM
set V it does not hold that there is a sequence of improvements
from one to the other. Condition (ii) of Definition 2 expresses
pairwise CP external stability. For every matching µ outside the
pairwise CP vNM set V it holds that there isµ′ ∈ V and a sequence
of matchingsµ0, . . . , µk′ withµ0 = µ andµk′ = µ′ such that, for
every k ∈ {0, . . . , k′ − 1}, µk+1 ∈ h(µk).
The definition of a pairwise CP vNM set is equivalent to the
definition of a generalized stable set for abstract systems as
18 P. Jean-Jacques Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 71 (2017) 14–19introduced in van Deemen (1991), when we consider the abstract
system (M, h). It corresponds to the stable set with respect to path
dominance in Page and Wooders (2009) when h is taken to be the
direct dominance relation.
Theorem 1. A set of matchings is a pairwise CP vNM set if and only if
it is equal to the core.
Proof. We start with the ‘‘if’’ part of the proof and show that the
core C is a pairwise CP vNM set.
Let some µ ∈ C be given. It holds by definition of the core that
f (µ) = ∅. Since h(µ) ⊂ f (µ), it follows that h(µ) = ∅. Pairwise
CP internal stability follows.
Let someµ ∈M\C be given.Wehave to show that h∞(µ)∩C ≠
∅. It follows from Theorem in Roth and Vande Vate (1990) that
h∞(µ) contains a stablematching. Since a stablematching belongs
to C by Theorem 3.3 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), pairwise CP
external stability follows.
We continue with the ‘‘only if’’ part of the proof and show that
C is the only pairwise CP vNM set. Let V be a pairwise CP vNM set.
For every µ ∈ C it holds that h(µ) ⊂ f (µ) = ∅. Since V satisfies
pairwise CP external stability, it follows that C ⊂ V .
Suppose V \ C ≠ ∅. Let some µ′ ∈ V \ C be given. Combining
again theorem in Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Theorem 3.3
in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), it follows that h∞(µ′) ∩ C ≠ ∅,
therefore h∞(µ′) ∩ V ≠ ∅, thereby violating pairwise CP internal
stability. Consequently, it holds that V \ C = ∅. 
Theorem of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) proposes a family
of random processes, beginning from an arbitrary matching and
selecting a blocking pair at random to create a newmatching, that
will reach a stable matching with probability one. In the proof
of Theorem 1, we use this result to prove that the core satisfies
pairwise CP external stability and that the core is the unique
pairwise CP vNM set.
An alternative to the pairwise CP vNM set is to allow a
coalition of any size to form and block, while respecting coalitional
sovereignty. We denote the transitive closure of g by g∞.
Definition 3. A set of matchings V ⊂ M is a CP vNM set if it
satisfies the following:
(i) CP internal stability: For every µ,µ′ ∈ V , it holds that µ′ ∉
g∞(µ).
(ii) CP external stability: For every µ ∈ M \ V , it holds that
g∞(µ) ∩ V ≠ ∅.
The definition of a CP vNM set is equivalent to the definition
of a generalized stable set for abstract systems as introduced in
van Deemen (1991), when we consider the abstract system (M, g)
and it corresponds to the stable setwith respect to path dominance
in Page and Wooders (2009) when g is taken to be the direct
dominance relation.
Letµ ∈M be a matching. We have already argued that h(µ) ⊂
g(µ). If it would be true that h∞(µ) = g∞(µ) then it would be
immediate that the result of Theorem 1 is also valid for the CP
vNM set. The following example demonstrates that h∞(µ) can be
a proper subset of g∞(µ).2
Example 2. Consider a matching problem (M,W ,≻), whereM =
{m1,m2},W = {w1, w2}, and the preferences of the individuals
are as follows.
m1 m2
w1 w2
w2 w1
m1 m2
w1 w2
w1 w2
m1 m2
m2 m1.
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.The preferences in Example 2 are such that man m1 prefers to be
married to w1 rather than to w2 and m2 prefers to be married to
w2 rather than to w1. Also, woman w1 prefers m1 over m2 and
woman w2 prefers m2 over m1, but contrary to the men, women
prefer not to be married at all. As in Example 1, we define µ′ =
{(m1, w2), (m2, w1)} and µ∗ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}. It is easily
verified that µ∗ ∈ g(µ′) and therefore µ∗ ∈ g∞(µ′). We argue
next that µ∗ ∉ h∞(µ′). The first observation is that at any µ ∈
h(µ′) it holds that one of the women is single. If µ is obtained
from µ′ by the destruction of a match by an individual, this is
obviously true. If µ is obtained from µ′ by a blocking pair (m, w),
then µ′(m) is single at µ. Observe next that once a woman w is
single, she has reached her most preferred situation, and can no
longer be involved in a further pairwise improvement. It follows
that µ∗ ∉ h∞(µ′) and therefore h∞(µ′) is a proper subset of
g∞(µ′).
The next result demonstrates that g∞(µ) and h∞(µ) are
identical for individually rational matchings µ.
Theorem 2. For every individually rational µ ∈ M, it holds that
g∞(µ) = h∞(µ).
Proof. Let someµ ∈M be given. Obviously, it holds that h∞(µ) ⊂
g∞(µ).
To show the converse, it is sufficient to show that for everyµ ∈
M, for every µ′ ∈ g(µ), there is a sequence µ0, . . . , µk′ such that
µ = µ0, µ′ = µk′ and, for every k = 0, . . . , k′ − 1, µk+1 ∈ h(µk),
so µ′ ∈ hk′(µ).
Letµ ∈M, µ′ ∈ g(µ), and S ∈ N be given such thatµ′(S) = S,
for every i ∈ µ(S)\S, µ′(i) = i, for every i ∈ N\(S∪µ(S)), µ′(i) =
µ(i), and µ′≻S µ. Since µ′≻S µ and µ is individually rational,
it holds that, for every i ∈ S, µ′(i)≻i µ(i)≽i i, so in particular
µ′(i) ≠ i. Therefore, there is k′ such that S = {i0, . . . , i2k′−1} and
for every ik ∈ S with k ≤ k′ − 1, µ′(ik) = ik+k′ .
We form the sequence µ0, . . . , µk′ by defining, for k =
0, . . . , k′ − 1, µk+1 = µk + (ik, ik+k′). Let some k = 0, . . . , k′ − 1
be given. It holds that
ik+k′ = µ′(ik)≻ik µk(ik),
since µk(ik) = ik or µk(ik) = µ(ik). Similarly, it follows that
ik≻ik+k′ µk(ik+k′). We have shown that µk+1 ∈ h(µk). 
We now show the analogue of Theorem 1 for CP vNM sets.
Theorem 3. A set of matchings is a CP vNM set if and only if it is equal
to the core.
Proof. We start with the ‘‘if’’ part of the proof and show that the
core C is a CP vNM set.
Let some µ ∈ C be given. It holds by definition of the core that
f (µ) = ∅. Since g(µ) ⊂ f (µ), it follows that g(µ) = ∅. CP internal
stability follows.
Let someµ ∈M\C be given.Wehave to show that g∞(µ)∩C ≠
∅. Since h∞(µ) ⊂ g∞(µ), this follows from pairwise CP external
stability as shown in Theorem 1.
We continue with the ‘‘only if’’ part of the proof and show that
C is the only CP vNM set. Let V be a CP vNM set. For every µ ∈ C it
holds that g(µ) ⊂ f (µ) = ∅. Since V satisfies CP external stability,
it follows that C ⊂ V .
Suppose V \C ≠ ∅. Let someµ′ ∈ V \C be given. Since g∞(µ′)∩
C ≠ ∅ by CP external stability of C , it holds that g∞(µ′) ∩ V ≠ ∅,
thereby violating CP internal stability. Consequently, it holds that
V \ C = ∅. 
In general, the vNM stable set with g as the dominance relation,
Vg , is substantially different from the vNM stable set with h as the
dominance relation, Vh, as shown in Example 1. However, these
differences disappear whenever the external stability as based on
direct dominance is replaced by path dominance.
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We study stable sets for one-to-one matching problems that
take the requirement of coalitional sovereignty into account.
Coalitional sovereignty means that the objecting coalition does
not have the power to arrange the matchings of agents outside
the coalition. In these new notions of stable sets, the internal and
external stability conditions are formulated using path dominance,
following van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009), and
motivated by Example 1.
We consider both general coalitional deviations as well as
pairwise deviations, resulting in the concepts of CP vNM set and
pairwise CP vNM set. We obtain a unique prediction for both
concepts: the matchings that belong to the core. This contrasts
with the findings of Ehlers (2007), who shows that the set of
matchings in the core is a subset of any vNM stable set and may
contain matchings outside the core when the dominance relation
does not respect coalitional sovereignty.
In the characterization of the pairwise CP vNM set and the
CP vNM set, Theorems 1 and 3, we use the result of Roth and
Vande Vate (1990) that starting from an arbitrary matching it
is possible to find a sequence of blocking pairs that ultimately
reaches a stable matching. We use this result to prove that the
core satisfies pairwise CP external stability and that the core is the
unique (pairwise) CP vNM set.
We have restricted our analysis to one-to-one matching
problems, but the concepts of CP vNM set and pairwise CP vNM
set can also be defined for roommate problems or many-to-many
matching problems.3 For roommate problems, Chung (2000) and
Diamantoudi et al. (2004) provide conditions on preferences such
that a decentralized process along the lines of Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) converges to a stable roommate matching with probability
one. Under such conditions on preferences, one can show the
CP vNM set and the pairwise CP vNM set to be unique and to
coincide with the set of stable roommate matchings, following
similar arguments as in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3.
Since for roommate problems, the notions of CP vNM set and
pairwise CP vNM set correspond to generalized stable sets for
suitably chosen abstract systems in the sense of van Deemen
(1991), we obtain existence of CP vNM sets and pairwise CP
vNM sets without conditions on preferences. Moreover, such sets
consists of one representative element of each closed cycle in the
sense of Jackson and Watts (2002). An interesting direction for
future research would be whether it is possible to characterize
these closed cycles.
In a similar way, using the results of Klaus and Klijn (2007), our
results can be extended to matching problems with couples and,
using the results of Kojima and Ünver (2008), to many-to-many
matching problems. In these more challenging environments,
there is again a need for assumptions on the preferences to obtain
a neat characterization of the (pairwise) CP vNM set. The concepts
exist without conditions on the preferences. For the many-to-
many case, there are several possibilities to define dominance
correspondences that satisfy coalitional sovereignty, depending
on the treatment of matches between members of the deviating
3 We thank an anonymous referee for making us emphasize the greater
generality of our results.coalition and non-coalition members. Finally, contrary to the one-
to-one matching case, for the many-to-many case, it matters
whether one considers only pairwise deviations or not.
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